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Abstract 
Possibilistic logic has been proposed as a nu­
merical formalism for reasoning with uncertainty. 
There has been interest in developing qualitative 
accounts of possibility, as well as an explana­
tion of the relationship between possibility and 
modal logics. We present two modal logics that 
can be used to represent and reason with qual­
itative statements of possibility and necessity. 
Within this modal framework, we are able to iden­
tify interesting relationships between possibilis­
tic logic, beliefs and conditionals. In particular, 
the most natural conditional definable via possi­
bilistic means for default reasoning is identical to 
Pearl's conditional for c:-semantics. 
1 Introduction 
There has been a great deal of interest in the relationship 
between numeric and non-numeric approaches to uncer­
tain reasoning. Possibilistic has been proposed as one such 
numeric formalism (see (Dubois and Prade 1988) for and 
introduction), providing necessity measures, which deter­
mine the degree of certainty associated with an item of 
belief, and the dual possibility measures, determining the 
degree of surprise associated with (or the willingness to ac­
cept) a potential belief. Naturally, qualitative accounts of 
possibilistic logic have been proposed and shown to corre­
spond to these measures (Dubois 1986). Such qualitative 
characterizations give us the ability to express possibilistic 
relationships without having to assume particular numerical 
values, relying only on the relative possibility of proposi­
tions. 
A logic of qualitative possibility is crucial if we wish to 
derive consequences based on partial information. Given 
some constraints on the relationship between certain propo­
sitions, certain other constraints may be required to hold on 
any suitable possibility measure. A logical calculus permits 
us to specify a partial (qualitative) possibility measure and 
derive information implicit in the specification. We can rea­
son without requiring complete information. One such pos­
sibilistic logic is developed in (Farinas and Herzig 1991). 
Others have provided logics in which logical constraints on 
probabilities can be specified in an analogous fashion (see, 
e.g., (Bacchus 1990; Frisch and Haddawy 1988), though 
these retain the quantitative aspects of probabilities). 
Given the nature of necessity and possibility measures, the 
connection to modal logics is also of great interest (Dubois 
and Prade 1988) since the latter are typically put forth as 
representation systems for notions of possibility and neces­
sity. We will present two modal logics, CO and CO*, in 
which we can faithfully represent the notions of qualita­
tive necessity and possibility. These representations will 
respect the essential qualities of possibility and necessity 
measures. The expressive power we need to capture pos­
sibilistic logic is achieved with two modalities: the usual 
o, corresponding to truth at accessible worlds; and the less 
standard a, expressing truth at inaccessible worlds. We 
note that, in contrast to many multimodal logics used in 
knowledge representation, the additional modality carries 
no excess semantical baggage. Our semantics is based on 
the usual Kripke structures for monomodal logics, the added 
modal operator increasing only our ability to constrain the 
form of such structures. The correspondence does not use 
the (perhaps expected) mapping of qualitative necessity and 
possibility into the operators o and 0. However, we pro­
vide other operators, defined using 0 and a that do capture 
these absolute notions. 
Aside from demonstrating that simple modal logics can 
be used to express qualitative possibility, the embedding 
into CO and CO* also illustrates important connections 
to a number of other formalisms for defeasible reasoning 
(which have also been mapped onto our logics). Some of 
these include conditional approaches to default reasoning 
(Lehmann 1989), <:·semantics (Pearl 1988), belief revision 
(Gat"denfors 1988), counterfactuallogics (Lewis 1973) and 
autoepistemic logic (Moore 1985; Levesque 1990). In the 
next section we discuss qualitative possibility and present 
the logics CO and CO*. We show how these logics may 
be used to represent qualitative possibility. In Section 3, 
we examine the connections between possibilistic logic and 
some other systems for defeasible reasoning. Of particular 
interest is the fact we can define a conditional for default 
reasoning in terms of our possibility logics that is identical 
to Pearl's (1988) conditional for e-semantics. This rela-
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tionship has been examined by Dubois and Prade (199la), 
but our formulation has independent motivation, and lends 
itself to a complete calculus of conditionals. Furthermore, 
the expressive power of our logics allows us to express 
important properties that cannot be stated otherwise. 
2 A Modal Representation of Possibility 
2.1 Possibilistic Logic 
Possibilistic logic has been developed to a great extent by 
Dubois and Prade (see their (1988) for a survey). A possi­
bility measure II maps the sentences of LcPL into the real 
interval [0, 1]. The value II( a) is intended to represent the 
degree of possibility of a. We take this to represent the 
amount of surprise associated with adopting a as an epis­
temic possibility. If II( a) = 1 there is no surprise (i.e., a 
is consistent with the agent's beliefs), while II( a) = 0 in­
dicates that surprise is maximal (i.e., an agent would never 
adopt a). A possibility measure must satisfy the following 
three properties: 
(a) II(T) = 1 
(b) ll(l.) = 0 
(c) II( A VB) = max(II(A), II( B)) 
A necessity measure N is a similar mapping, associating 
with a a degree of necessity. We take N(a) to represent 
the amount of surprise associated with giving up belief in 
a (or the degree of entrenchment of a in a belief set; see 
Section 4). If N(a) = 1 then a is fully entrenched and can 
never be given up, while N(a) = 0 indicates that a is not 
believed at all. Naturally, tbe degree of surprise associated 
with giving up a belief a should be related to the degree 
of surprise in accepting -.a as an epistemic possibility, for 
giving up a is just accepting -.a as possible. Indeed, one 
may define necessity measures using the identity 
N(a) = 1- 11(-.a). 
Qualitative necessity measures are discussed in (Dubois 
and Prade 1991b; Farinas and Herzig 1991). Postulates are 
proposed constraining the qualitative relationship a ?: N /3, 
which is read as "a is at least as necessary as /3." If we 
define a?: N /3 to be true just when N(a)?: N(/3) for any 
necessity measure N, then ?: N will satisfy the postulates for 
qualitative necessity (in finite settings), and these relations 
are the only ones that can be so-defined (Dubois 1986). 
A qualitative necessity ordering is any ordering satisfying 
these postulates:1 
(Nl) A?: N A 
(N2) A ?: N B or B ?: N A 
(N3) If A ?: N B and B ?: N C then A ?: N C 
(N4) T > N j_ 
(NS) T ?: N A for all A 
1For any ordering we propose (e.g. ?: N), the corresponding 
relations :::; . < and> are defined in the standard way. 
(N6) If B ?: N C then A 1\ B ?: N A 1\ C for all A 
Qualitative possibility is defined by related postulates, 
with a ?:�r f3 meaning a is at least as possible as /3, or 
II( a) ?: II(/3). The relationship between these qualitative 
relationships can be given as A?: N B iff-.B ?:�r ..,A. 
Farinas and Herzig (1991) have axiomatized this notion 
with a logic called qualitative possibility logic (QPL), in 
which the relation �II' is incorporated as a conditional con­
nective. They also make an initial attempt to develop a 
modal theory of possibility that uses only unary modal op­
erators in place of the conditional ?:�r· Unfortunately, the 
resulting logic PL requires an infinite set of modal operators, 
each corresponding to a unique member of the measure set 
for II. Semantically, each operator is evaluated with respect 
to a separate accessibility relation. This certainly permits 
the expression of qualitative properties like a ?:�r /3, but 
doesn't seem to reflect the qualitative nature of QPL or 
other qualitative postulates. In particular, there is no modal 
operator corresponding to (some degree of) possibility or 
necessity. This appears to be the first logical axiomatization 
of qualitative possibility and, as such, provides many of the 
advantages we expect of a logical calculus. Furthermore, 
they show QPL is equivalent to Lewis's {1973) logic VN. 
2.2 The Logics CO and CO• 
We wish to provide a possible worlds semantics for quali­
tative possibility theory, taking our models to consist of a 
set W of possible worlds and a binary accessibility rela­
tion R over W. Intuitively, W is the set of situations an 
agent considers possible. We do not intend this to represent 
epistemic possibility, for there will be worlds among this 
set that are inconsistent with an agent's beliefs. Rather, 
these are the set of worlds an agent could possibly consider 
adopting, even if it changed its mind about certain beliefs 
it currently possesses. For example, W could be the set of 
physically or logically possible worlds (for an agent). 
We take R to be a ranking of. these worlds according to 
their degree of possibility or plausibility, the extent to which 
an agent is willing to accept these worlds as epistemically 
possible, or consistent with its beliefs. When wRv we 
intend that vis at least as possible as w. Intuitively, when 
v is more possible than w we can think of v as being "more 
consistent" with an agent's current beliefs than w; or tbink 
of v as a preferable, more plausible alternative state of 
affairs for an agent to adopt should it be forced to choose 
between the two. 
We take as minimal requirements tbat R be reflexive and 
transitive.2 Another requirement we adopt in this paper 
is that of connectedness. In other words, any two states 
of affairs must be comparable according to their degree of 
possibility. If neither is more possible than the other, then 
they are equally possible. 
If we intend the possibility ranking to respect an agent's 
current belief set, then it ought to be the case that the max-
2In (Boutilier 1992a) we develop this minimal logic called 
CT40 in the context of belief revision. 
� 
© 
---+---
(ue\ 
� 
t 
feV\ 
� 
+ " 
More 
Plausible 
Figure 1: A CO-model 
imally possible worlds in this ranking be precisely those 
the agent considers not merely possible, but epistemically 
possible (i.e., those worlds consistent with its beliefs). Al­
though we do not need to enforce this constraint to deal 
with possibilistic logic, we will discuss how this can be 
expressed in Section 3, and how beliefs are related to pos­
sibi1ity measures. 
We now define a modal language with which we can ex­
press qualitative notions of possibility and necessity. Our 
language L will be formed from a denumerable set P of 
propositional variables, together with the connectives ....,, 
:::), 0 and 5. The connectives/\, v and= are defined in 
terms of these in the usual way. We use T and .i to denote 
the identically true and false propositions, respectively. We 
denote by LcPL the propositional sublanguage of L. 
Definition (Boutilier 1991) A CO-model is a triple M � 
(W, R, !{)}, where W is a set (of possible worlds), R 
is a transitive, connected3 binary relation on W (the 
accessibility relation), and V' maps P into 2w (I{)( A) 
is the set of worlds where A is true). 
A CO-model consists of a set of clusters of possible worlds 
totally-ordered by R, where a cluster is a set of mutually ac­
cessible, or equally possible, worlds. In Figure 1 each large 
circle represents such a cluster of worlds and the (transitive 
closure ot) arrows indicate accessibility between clusters. 
Sow can see both u and v (wRu and wRv) but v cannot see 
w. All worlds above the dashed line are inaccessible tow, 
while all worlds below are accessible. Let M = (W, R, <p} 
be a CO-model, with w E W. The truth of a formula a at 
w in M is defined (for the interesting cases) as: 
1. M F=w Da iff for each v such that wRv, M F=v a. 
2. M F=w Daiff for eachv such that notwRv,M Fv a. 
The sentence Da is true at w if a holds at all worlds acces­
sible to w. Given our reading of R, this means a must be 
3 R is (totally) connected if wRv or vRw for any v, w E W 
(this implies reflexivity). 
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true at all worlds that have a degree of possibility at least 
equal to that of w. The sentence Da, in contrast, holds 
when a is true at an inaccessible worlds, those strictly "less 
possible" than w. While the standard o can force cenain 
(classes of) worlds to be inaccessible, 5 can force cenain 
worlds to be accessible. To illustrate the expressive power 
of CO, consider again figure 1. If w satisfies oA, this 
means no ...,A-worlds can be accessible tow. This forces 
all such worlds to be inaccessible. If the same wotld also 
satisfies D-oA, this means no A-worlds can be inaccessible, 
so all such worlds must be accessible. This type of con� 
straint cannot be enforced using D alone. When w satisfies 
DA 1\ B....,A, essentially a line is drawn across the structure 
(as in Figure 1), all worlds above It satisfying ...,A and all 
below it satisfying A. 
We can define several new connectives as follows: <>a =df 
...,o....,a; Oa =de ...,B....,a; Ba :elf Da 1\ Da; and Oa =dr 
<>a v Oa. It is easy to verify Utat these connectives have 
the fo1lowing truth conditions: <>a (Oa) is true at a wor1d if 
a holds at some accessible (inaccessible) world; Da (Oa) 
holds iff a holds at all (some) worlds, whether accessible 
or inaccessible. Validity is detined in a straightforward 
manner, a sentence a being co-valid O=co a) just when 
every CO-model M satisfies � at every world. 
Definition (Boutilier 1991) The conditional logic CO is 
the smallest S � L such that S contains CPL (and 
its substitution instances) and the following axiom 
schemata, and is closed under the following rules of 
inference: 
K D(A ::> B) :::) (OA :::) DB) 
K' o(A :::) B) :::) (DA :::> DB) 
T DA ::>A 
4 DA ::> DOA 
S A:::) B<>A 
H O(DA 1\ DB) :::) D(A v B) 
Nee From A infer DA. 
MP From A :::) B and A infer B. 
Provability and derivability are defined in the usual way, in 
terms of theoremhood (Hughes and Cresswell 1984 ). 
Theorem 1 {Boutilier 1991) l-eo a W"F=co a. 
We often want to ensure that all logically possible worlds 
are taken into consideration in our models (for instance 
in the context of belief revision (Boutilier 1992c) or au­
toepistemic reasoning (Levesque 1990; Boutilier 1992b)). 
In our current setting, we can think of this as ensuring that 
every logically possible world ts assigned some positive 
degree of possibility. For this purpose we introduce the 
logic co•, which is based on the class of CO-models in 
which all propositional valuations are represented (see also 
(Levesque 1990)). 
Definition (Boutilier 1991) CO* is the smallest extension 
of CO closed under all rules of CO and containing the 
following axioms: 
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LP Ocr for all satisfiable propositional cr. 
Definition (Boutilier 1991) A CO*-model is any CO­
model M = (W, R, If'), such that 
{/: f maps Pinto {0, 1}} � { w• :wE W}.4 
Theorem 2 (Boutilier 1991) l-eo. o W"F=co. o. 
2.3 A Modal Account 
We now take up the task of providing a simple modal ac­
count of qualitative possibility and necessity. Recall that 
a CO-structure orders worlds according to their degree of 
possibility. This is much like another formulation of possi­
bilistic logic in terms of possibility distributions. A distri­
bution 1r assigns to each world a degree of possibility from 
the interval [0, 1]. This too can be viewed as a ranking of 
worlds, with w being at least as possible as v just when 
1r(w) :;:: 1r(v), corresponding precisely to vRw in a CO­
model. A distribution determines a possibility measure II 
via the following relationship: 
II(A) = max{1r(w) : w F= A}. 
In other words, the degree of possibility of A is just that of 
the most possible A-world. 
In our qualitative setting we need not determine the absolute 
possibility of A, merely the relative possibility of pairs of 
sentences. Quantitatively, A is at least as possible as B iff 
the world of maximal possibility satisfying A (say w) is no 
less possible than the most possible B-world (say v); that 
is, 1r(w):;:: 1r(v). In a CO-structure this means vRw. So if 
A is at least as possible as B, then it must be the case that 
the minimal B-world in relation R can see the minimal A­
world.5 But, since vis a minimal B-world, all B-worlds see 
v; therefore, any B-world can see w (since R is transitive 
and connected). More generally, whenever A is at least 
as possible as B, any B-world can see some A-world. In 
our bimodal language this is expressed as D{B :J <>A): 
whenever B holds, there is some more plausible world 
satisfying A. We refer to this as a plausibility ordering (for 
reasons discussed in the next section). 
Definition Let M be a CO-model. The plausibility order­
ing determined by M is $PM· given by 
A $PM B iff M F= D(B :J <>A). 
A is at least as plausible as B iff A $PM B.6 
4For all wE W, w• is defined as the map from Pinto {0,1} 
such that w•(A) = 1 iff w E 'P(A); in other words, w• is the 
valuation associated with w. 
'we are speaking loosely here, of course. World w is a minimal 
A-world iff vRw for all A-worlds v. (Worlds minimal in R have 
maximal plausibility.) In this case w is "less than" any such v 
according to R, but (on our interpretation of R) has "greater" 
possibility than v. Nothing about CO-structures presupposes the 
existence of minimal A-worlds for any A, nor need they be unique 
when they do exist. We use this manner of speaking for illustrative 
purposes; but nothing of a technical nature depends on this. 
6We use $PM to indicate greater plausibility rather than �PM 
to remain consistent with (Grove 1988; Boutilier 1992a) and other 
papers (where this operator is related to other concepts). 
Figure 2: Entrenchment and Plausibility 
The dual of such a relationship is qualitative necessity, and 
we refer to this ordering as an entrenchment ordering (again, 
explained in the next section). 
Definition Let M be a CO-model. The entrenchment or­
dering determined by M is $EM, given by 
B $EM A iff -,B $PM -,A. 
A is at least as entrenched as B iff B $EM A. 
It is easy to see that B $EM A iff M F= o (-,A :J <>..,B). 
Figure 2 shows a CO-model where A, B, ..,B and C are 
each more plausible than -,A. Every world where -,A holds 
is strictly less plausible than some world where these other 
propositions hold. We also see that A 1\ -,c is more plau­
sible than -,A 1\ C. A and C are equally (and maximally) 
plausible, yet A is more entrenched than C. This is due 
to the fact that as we "move up" from the bottom cluster, 
we find a -,c�world before a -.A-world. -.Cis more read­
ily "accepted" than -,A, so Cis less entrenched. Notice, 
since there are no worlds satisfying (say) -,A 1\ -,B in the 
model, we judge all such worlds to have no plausibility, 
1r( w) = 0. Correspondingly, according to our definition of 
$p M, -.A 1\ -.B is (strictly) less plausible than any sen­
tence satisfied in the model. Furthermore, every sentence 
in the language is at least as plausible as -.A 1\ -,B. That 
is, o '5:PM -.A 1\ -.B for all a (including a = J.). Thus, 
we see that II( -.A 1\ -.B) = 0. As mentioned above, one 
should think of the R-minimal worlds in a model (those with 
maximal plausibility) as representing the epistemic state of 
the agent in question. In other words, each minimal world 
is epistemically possible. In this example, we consider the 
two lowest worlds to be those consistent with the agent's 
beliefs, while all other worlds violate some belief. Here, 
the agent believes A 1\ C. In the next section we will see 
how belief can be expressed at the object level. 
We can show two key results concerning this model of 
qualitative possibility. 
Theorem 3 Any entrenchment ordering determined by a 
CO-model M is a qualitative necessity ordering satisfying 
postulates (Nl) through (N6). 
Theorem 4 For any qualitative necessity orrkring � ,. 
there is a CO-model M detennining the corresponding en­
trenchment orrlering: A �EM B iff A � N B. 
These results show that necessity orderings and entrench­
ment orderings determined by CO are exactly the same. 
It inunediately follows that the space of plausibility order­
ings determined by CO-models corresponds precisely to the 
set of qualitative possibility orderings. The first theorem 
is easy to verify using the definition of A 5EM B and 
the logical properties of CO. The second theorem can be 
shown as follows: we consider the corresponding qualita­
tive possibility measure� .. and constrUct a CO-model that 
determines the plausibility ordering (it is easy to see that 
the dual entrenchment and necessity orderings will then be 
equivalent as well). We can constrUct a CO-model M us­
ing as worlds the maximal consistent sets of LcPL (which 
determine the obvious valuations). We define cuts on the 
language as any set C � LcPL such that if A E C and 
A � .. B then B E C (see Grove (1988), who uses this 
technique). We exclude from M all worlds that intersect 
only the minimal cut. {A : l. � ... A}, and define accessi­
bility as follows: 
wRv iff every cut C that intersects v also inter­
sects w (i.e., v n C :f: 0 implies w n C :f: 0). 
It is easy to verify that M is a CO-model. We can also 
show that M F Ei(B :::> OA) iff A � .. B. We sketch this 
briefly, assuming B >,. J..  Let w be a world containing B 
and C be the "smallest" cut that intersects w. If A � .. B 
the properties of� .. ensure that: a) if A is consistent witb 
the negation of all sentences inC then there is a maximal 
consistent set v containing A disjoint from C; b) if A is 
inconsistent with tbis set it is easy to verify that A Is in C 
but that A is in no smaller cut than C. In either case wRv 
for some A-world v and M F D(B :::> <>A).The converse 
is quite clear. 
As discussed by Dubois (1986), for finitary languages a 
qualitative possibility measure is compatible with a map­
ping of sentences into the interval [0, 1] iff the mapping 
is a possibility measure (compatibility means A � .. B iff 
IT(A) � II( B)). Hence, plausibility orderings in CO are 
precise qualitative counterparts of possibility measures, and 
entrenchment orderings correspond to necessity measures. 
Our treatment of plausibility and entrenchment generalizes 
that of Dubois and Prade by permitting orderings on infinite 
languages (with CO-models serving as adequate represen­
tation structures). 
3 Beliefs and Conditionals 
3.1 Beliefs 
We have seen how to express qualitative possibility and 
necessity measures using two modal operators. More im­
portantly, the relationship to CO allows us to exhibit con­
nections between possibility theory and other forms of de­
feasible reasoning. We begin by explaining the choice of 
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terminology of the last section. The ordering 5EM deter­
mined by some CO-model turns out to be an expectation 
orrkring in the sense of Gllrdenfors and Makinson ( 1991 ). 
These themselves are weakenings of orderings of eplstemic 
entrenchment (GIIrdenfors 1988), which are intended to rep­
resent the degree of certainty of elements of a belief set K. 
For any (deductively closed) belief set K an entrenchment 
ordering 5E (A 5E B means B is at least as entrenched 
as A) satisfies the postulates 
(El) If A 5E B and B 5E C then A 5E C 
(El) If A 1- B then A 5E B 
(E3) If A, B E K then A 5E A f\ B or B 5E A 1\ B 
(E4) If K :f:. Cn(l.) then A fl. K iff A 5E B for all B 
(ES) If B 5E A for all B then 1- A 
Dubois and Prade ( 1991 b) show a partial correspondence 
between qualitative necessity and entrenchment. For any 
necessity ordering � N. they define the set of beliefs asso-
ciated with � N to be -
K ={a: a> N J..} 
Assuming that N(J..) = 0 for any necessity measure used 
to "generate .. the necessity ordering, this means N (a) > 0. 
Thus, a is believed just when it has some degree of neces­
sity. Entrenchment and qualitative necessity correspond if 
we ignore (N4) and (E5). Entrenchment fails to satisfy (N4) 
only when every sentence is equally entrenched (including 
J..); that is, when we are dealing with the inconsistent belief 
set. We will ignore this case and assume that entrenchment 
orderings are nontrivial, satisfying (N4).7 
Qualitative necessity fails to satisfy (E5) because certain 
nontautologous beliefs are allowed to be certain or com­
pletely necessary (i.e •• N(a) = 1). In general, entrench­
ment orderings determined by CO-models will not satisfy 
(E5). But if we consider only CO*-models, every logi­
cally consistent a has some degree of possibility, and every 
contingent sentence will be less cenain than T. Thus (E5) 
is satisfied by the full qualitative necessity ordering deter­
mined by any CO*-model. 
Theorem S (Boutilier 1992b) Any entrenchment orrkring 
determined l7y a CO*-model satisfies (El)- (E5). 
Theorem 6 (Boutilier 1992b) For any entrenchment or· 
de ring 5E there is a CO*-model M detennining the corre­
sponding entrenchment ordering: A 5EM B iff A 5E B. 
Of course, the real reason for examining logics of qualitative 
necessity and possibility is to provide a method of express· 
ing and reasoning with qualitative constraints on necessity 
and possibility (i.e., premises) without relying on complete 
knowledge of, say, a possibility ordering or measure. Given 
certain constraints we can determine through logical deduc­
tion what must be trUe in all measures or orderings satisfying 
'We can capture the trivial ordering by considering the empty 
"CO-model'' as a model for entrenchment Axiomatically we can 
express the ordering using the inconsistent theory { l.}. 
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these constraints. The expressive power of CO and CO* 
can also be used to capture notions that are not amenable 
to direct analysis using a simple language of qualitative 
necessity or possibility (e.g., Farinas and Herzig's QPL). 
Naturally, we'd like to express relationships of qualitative 
possibility. In QPL one may assert A �. B, while in CO 
we say D(B ::> <>A) to indicate that A is as possible as B. 
Absolute concepts such as belief, disbelief, possibility and 
necessity are important as well. These can also be asserted 
in QPL; for example, '"'A is believed" is just T > • ..,A. In 
CO, these modalities can be expressed as follows: 
• When a is believed it must have some degree of neces­
sity (N(a) > 0). In CO this is expressible as ODa. 
This is true exactly when there is some point is the 
model where a holds at all more plausible worlds. In 
particular, such a point exists when a holds at the most 
possible worlds (assuming such a limit). We define 
a modality for belief in this way, Ba denoting ooa. 
The model in Figure 2 satisfies BA and BG. It is 
easy to verify that CO satisfies the axioms of the belief 
logic weak S5 when B is taken as a modal operator. 
Thus, qualitative possibility respects some reasonable 
conditions on the beliefs it determines. Some of the 
more notable properties are the introspective axioms, 
which are valid in CO: 
Ba :> BBa and ..,sa :> 8-,Ba 
Notice that Ba and 8-.a are mutually inconsistent, but 
a and 8-.a are not. 
• Disbelief is expressed as -.Ba. This is true just when 
N(a) = 0, or 11(-,a) = 1. Notice that -.Ba and 
...,a...,a are mutually consistent. The model in Figure 2 
satisfies -.BB and -.8-.B. 
• If a has some degree of possibility (11(-.a) > 0), 
..,a cannot be certain. This holds exactly when Oa is 
verified (a is true at some world with a nonzero degree 
of possibility). 
• Finally, a is completely necessary (N(a) = 1) exactly 
when Da holds. The model inFigure 2 satisfies D(Av 
B) since A V B holds at each world (it is completely 
necessary) • ..,A 1\ -.B is accorded no possibility at all. 
Some degree of necessity is assigned to a (N( a) > 0) 
just when it is believed; that is, Ba is true. So, in 
the example, B and -.B have a necessity measure of 
zero (since neither is believed). A and Care accorded 
some (less than absolute) degree of necessity, with A 
being more necessary (or entrenched) than C. 
CO and CO* are much stronger than this. In particular, these 
logics allow us to express the concept of only knowing. To 
only know (or only believe) a sentence a is to believe a 
and to believe nothing more than is required by a (Levesque 
1990). For example, given a (finite) knowledfe base KB, 
we usually intend that KB is all that is believed. If KB f= a 
8We will often use KB as if it were the conjunction of its 
elements (a sentence). For a fuller discussion of only knowing see 
(Levesque 1990; Boutilier 1992b). 
then a is believed; if KB � a then a is not believed. In 
the usual epistemic logics, merely asserting B(KB) does 
not carry this force. Indeed, B(KB) does not preclude the 
possibility ofBa when KBU {a} is consistent, even if KB � 
a. To express that the sentences in KB are believed in QPL, 
we need only assert that T >. KB (or that N(KB) > 0 
in a quantitative setting). But there are no convenient and 
systematic means of asserting that these are the only beliefs, 
or that these are the only sentences that have some positive 
degree of necessity. 
In CO, we can express the fact that KB is all that is believed 
using the sentence 
O(KB) =de D(KB ::> (DKB A D-.KB)) 
Typically, we consider only CO*-models when discussing 
"all that is known," for this terminology suggests that no 
logical possibilities should be excluded from consideration. 
When KB is believed, only KB-worlds can be accepted as 
epistemically possible. When KB is all that is believed, not 
only should KB be believed, but every KB-world should be 
accepted as epistemically possible. If some world is not 
accepted, then there should be some belief that excludes 
this world from consideration, some belief falsified by that 
world. If a world satisfies KB, there is no such belief when 
KB is all that is believed. 
For purely propositional KB we have that 
O(KB) F=co. Ba iff KB f= a 
O(KB) f=co. -.Ba iff KB � a 
(see (Boutilier 1992b) for details). In particular, the only 
sentences assigned a degree of necessity greater than 0 are 
those entailed by KB. In a natural and convenient fash­
ion we can summarize what would require an infinite set 
of sentences in QPL, (or an unwieldy number for finite 
languages). The model in Figure 2 satisfies O(A 1\ C), 
assuming a language with only three atoms (and ignoring 
the fact that this is not a CO*-model). Thus, O(A 1\ C) is 
a concise way of expressing that only the consequences of 
A 1\ C are assigned a positive degree of necessity. Again, 
this is crucial since, when one specifies some knowledge 
base KB, it is usually intended that only those sentences 
derivable from KB are believed. 
The expressive power of CO goes beyond this, however. 
Nothing prevents the occurrence of nonpropositional sen­
tences in KB. We can have belief sentences in KB, and even 
sentences of an autoepistemic nature. In fact, in (Boutilier 
1992b) we show that co• subsumes autoepistemic logic. 
So we can think of co• as adding to qualitative possi­
bility logic the ability to express autoepistemic reasoning. 
With this connection, of course, degrees of possibility or 
entrenchment can be interpreted as generalizing autoepis­
temic logic as well. 
3.2 Conditionals 
CO has been used as a conditional logic for representing 
default rules. In (Boutilier 1990; Boutilier 1991) we define a 
conditional connective=>. reading A => B as "A normally 
implies B." We can show that co•, used in this way, 
captures Lehmann's (1989) rational consequence relations 
and Pearl's (1988) €-semantics. This connective can be 
related to our plausibility orderings as follows: 
Theorem 7 Let M be a CO-model. Then M I= A � B iff 
A 1\ B <PM A 1\ -,B or M I= 0-,A. 
In other words, A � B holds just when A A B is more 
possible than A A ...,B (or A is impossible, II(A) = 0). 
With a little simplification of these conditions, we obtain 
the definition of the connective� as presented by Boutilier 
(1990; 1991) 
A� B =dr 0-,A V O(A 1\ D(A ::> B)) 
Thus we can define an inferential relation on conditional 
sentences (or default rules) using qualitative possibility, 
and it will be equivalent to a number of other systems of 
defeasible inference. These include the following systems 
(whose relationship to CO is explored in the corresponding 
references): Pearl's (1988) €-semantics (Boutilier 1992d; 
Boutilier 1990); Lehmann's (1989) preferential and ratio­
nal consequence relations (Boutilier 1990); the purely con­
ditional fragment of Lewis's (1973) counterfactual logic 
VC (Boutilier 1992c). As discussed above, Gru-denfors and 
Makinson's (1991) notion of expectation inference, based 
on their expectation orderings, also corresponds to this sort 
of conditional possibilistic inference (ignoring the trivial 
expectation ordering), a connection they point out. We 
note that most of these equivalences rely on our specifi­
cation of qualitative necessity and possibility in terms of 
nonfinite languages. 
Example Let A, S, E stand for "adult", "grad student" and 
"employed", respectively, and consider the following 
set of premises (a standard example from the default 
reasoning literature): 
{A� E,S� A,S � -,E} 
Our conditionals are exception-allowing since A A -,E 
is consistent with this theory. Preference for more 
specific defaults is automatically incorporated into the 
definition of � as well. From this theory we can 
deriveS 1\ A � -,E using consequence in CO, but 
we cannot derive S 1\ A => E. Also derivable are 
constraints on permissible possibility assignments, for 
example, it must be that A >,. S. It is more plausible 
that someone is simply an adult than a grad student. 
The relationship with €-semantics holds particular interest 
since its semantic foundations rely on probabilistic notions. 
By presenting qualitative possibility andc-semantics within 
our modal framework we can show the following equiva­
lence. We assume a __... {3 is some abstract conditional, 
being interpreted either as => in CO or as a default rule in 
the sense of €-semantics (we assume a is satisfiable). 
Theorem 8 Let T be a finite conditional theory consisting 
of sentences of the form a - {3, where a, {3 E LcPL- Then 
T l-eo a--+ {3 if!T €-entails a--+ {3. 
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This follows from the results of(Boutilier 1990) and (Kraus, 
Lehmann and Magidor 1990), but a direct proof of this result 
is given in (Boutilier 1992a). 
This connection has also been examined by Dubois and 
Prade (199la). Using CO as the intermediate framework 
between s-semantics and qualitative possibility allows us 
to see the underlying semantic commonality in these sys­
tems. Adams's (1975) construction for determining the 
consistency of theories of statements about arbitrarily high 
probabilities can be interpreted as ranking possible worlds 
according to their degree of probability. Given this ranking, 
it is easy to ensure that the conditional probabilities of the 
statements in the theory are as high as they need to be. But 
this ranking can also be construed as a simple CO-model. 
Our interpretation of CO-models in this paper equates this 
ranking with the degree of possibility of worlds. On ei­
ther interpretation of the models, the same conclusions are 
derivable from simple conditional theories. 
The results of Boutilier (1990) also show that €-semantics 
can be modeled in the monomodal logic S4.9 Thus for 
the purely conditional fragment of qualitative possibility 
theories, representation and inference can be performed 
using S4 (and conversel(;, if S4 is restricted to its simple 
"conditional" fragment). 0 
Once we allow boolean combinations of conditionals, it is 
not clear that the intuitions underlying Adams's approach 
remain viable. Our semantics for qualitative possibility is 
more compelling in this case. We must also contrast our 
approach with the model of conditional possibility adopted 
by Dubois and Prade (1991a). They provide a semantics 
for (some) boolean combinations of conditionals defined in 
terms of possibility measures. Unfortunately, they equate 
the ''weak negation" of a conditional-,(A � B) with the 
"strong negation" A � -,B. This is certainly not the 
case on our definition of conditionals. Merely denying 
a conditional is not reason to accept that the antecedent 
justifies acceptance of the negation of the consequent. It 
should be quite reasonable to say "My door is not (normally) 
open or closed." In CO, the following is consistent: 
-,(A=> B) A -,(A=> ..,B). 
Our extension of the conditional language is much more 
compelling in this respect. 
4 Concluding Remarks 
We have presented two modal logics for reasoning about 
orderings of qualitative necessity and possibility. The ex­
pressive power of CO and co• can be used to express 
constraints on possibility measures in a natural and concise 
9See also (Boutilier 1992a) for a more detailed presentation. 
10We note that S4 structures are precisely CO-models without 
the requirement of connectedness. While this relaxation is not 
appropriate in general, simple conditional theories cannot express 
the distinction between the two types of structures. Thus the 
simple fragment of the (mono-) modal logic S4.3 (characterized 
by the class of connected, or CO, models) is also equivalent to 
these logics. See (Boutilier 1990) for details. 
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fashion (for example, through only knowing). As pointed 
out by a number of people, the numbers attached to proposi­
tions by possibility measures are perhaps ofless importance 
than the ranking of the propositions. We are able to exploit 
this fact in developing a simple semantic account of qual­
itative possibility. This simple view allows us to exhibit 
the connection between possibility theory and a number of 
other forms of defeasible reasoning. Furthermore, these 
modal possibilistic logics provide a means of representing 
very general constraints on possibility measures, since we 
allow arbitrary boolean combinations of formulae. 
A number of avenues remain to be explored. By generaliz­
ing the logic CO. we can explore weaker types ofpossibilis­
tic semantics. For example, by dropping the requirement 
of connectedness (obtaining the logic CT40 of (Boutilier 
1 992a)) we are in essence modeling partially ordered pos­
sibilistic measure sets. Though we have demonstrated or 
pointed to a number of connections to existing systems of 
defeasible reasoning, some of these remain to be explored 
in detail .  A number of other interesting relationships are 
brought to light by this work as well. Possibilistic logic has 
strong ties to Shafer's belief functions (Dubois and Prade 
1 991b). This suggests a link to the forms of defeasible 
reasoning discussed in the last section, a connection we 
have yet to explore. We have also begun preliminary in­
vestigations into the relationship between our conditional 
approaches to default reasoning based on CO* and proba­
bilistic systems of reasoning such as that of Bacchus (1 990), 
which could possibly bring to light further connections to 
possibilistic logic. 
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